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Market Conduct under Government Price
Intervention in the U.S. Dairy Industry
Donald J. Liu, Chin-Hwa Sun, and Harry M. Kaiser
The degree  of market  power exercised  by fliud  and  manufactured  processors  in the U.S.
dairy industry  is estimated.  Appelbaum's quantity-setting  conjectural  variation approach is
cast into a switching regime framework  to account for the two market regimes  created by
the existence of the dairy price support program:  (a) government  supported regime (market
price  is at the support price) and  (b) market  equilibrium regime (market price  is above the
support price).  The model  is also used to  test whether government  price intervention  has a
pro-competitive or anti-competitive  influence on market conduct.
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Introduction
The U.S.  dairy industry has become  more concentrated  over the last several  decades.  For
example,  between  1963  and  1987,  the 20-firn  concentration  ratios  for wholesale  butter,
cheese,  and fluid milk companies  increased  from 31%  to 94%,  59%  to 68%,  and 48%  to
67%, respectively  (U.S. Census of Manufacturers).  These concentration  ratios suggest that
models of the dairy industry should account for the market power of processors.
A framework that became popular in the  1980s for assessing the degree of market power
was  developed by Appelbaum.  Rather than assuming a certain market conduct,  the Appel-
baum procedure uses the concept of conjectural variation,  which is estimated endogenously
as  a measure of the degree of market  power.'  There  have been several applications of this
technique  to agricultural  industries  (Schroeter;  Schroeter  and Azzam  1990,  1991; Azzam
and Pagoulatos; Buschena and Perloff; Durham and Sexton; Wann and Sexton; Azzam and
Park). However, with few exceptions,  models of the U.S. dairy industry have assumed that
the market is perfectly competitive (e.g., Kaiser, Streeter, and Liu; La France and de Gorter).
To our knowledge Suzuki et al. is the only U.S. dairy study that incorporated a market power
parameter of cooperatives and fluid processors. However,  the role of government interven-
tion was ignored in Suzuki et al. In the U.S. dairy industry, government intervention through
the dairy price support program causes prices to be determined under two different structural
regimes: a "market equilibrium" regime, where the market price is above the support price,
and a "government  supported"  regime, where the support price is the effective  price.  In a
recent study Liu et al. presented an econometric model that allows for endogenous switching
between the two market regimes. Under this framework government  intervention becomes
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part of the market structure, since the reduced-form  equations for each regime are different.
However, Liu et al. assumed no market power on the part of industry participants.2
Given the importance of government programs in many of the U.S. and foreign agricul-
tural  industries,  an  obvious  question  is  how  to  estimate  the  market  power  of industry
participants when there is government intervention in the price formation process. The task
calls for merging the literature on market power with that on switching regime estimation.
This article presents a framework  for that purpose and then estimates the degree of selling
power exercised  by U.S.  fluid and manufactured  dairy processors using that framework.
The study also  examines whether  the conduct of processors  is different between the two
market regimes,  a relevant public policy issue.
A Conceptual Framework
Consider an oligopolistic  industry where individual firms face a downward sloping aggre-
gate demand curve and there is a government price support program for the product. Denote
the product by m. The demand equation  is specified in inverse form as:
(1)  p,,, = p,,(Qd, Z'"),
where Pn is the price of product m, Q',  is the aggregate demand quantity, and Z7 is a vector
of demand shifters.
Due  to government  price  supports,  the observed price  (P"'*)  depends on whether  the
government support price (P') is binding.  In the market equilibrium  regime, the observed
price  is higher than the  government support price and,  hence,  is equal  to P" plus a shock
(s"') to the demand equation in (1):
(2a)  pfl*  = P"'
1 + E,"  if P"' + £  > Pg.
Under the government  supported regime  P"'+ e m <  g,  and hence,  the observed  price is
equal to P~:
(2b)  P  = Pg  if P'  +  "  < Pg.
There is a distinction made between supply and demand quantities (Q'"  vs. Q""), because
they need not be equal, due to possible government purchases (Qg). More explicitly, one has
{3  Q  QEd + Q8 in the government supported regime,
Q3)  =  Q' Q
Q'd"  in the market equilibrium regime.
The  supply  relation  for  an individual  producer  or processor  (henceforth  processor)  is
given by the first-order condition of her maximization problem. Facing the demand equation
2Also see Shonkwiler and Maddala for a treatment of modeling agricultural  markets with government price support programs.
Ideally, a complete model would include the selling and buying power of both processors.  However, since this would greatly
increase the complexity of the switching regime estimation,  this study focuses  solely on the selling power of processors.
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in (1) and the switching scheme  in (2), the  ith processor maximizes the profit by choosing
the optimal supply quantity:
(4)  max 7i  = E[P`*  ]  q7i  - Ci, (q,  W"' ),
where E[P'"*] is the expected output price;  ql.  is the ith processor's output supply quantity
(with  ISq"- = Q,"); and  C,"  is  the  cost function,  which  depends  on  q,"  and  a vector of
parametric variable costs (W").
The first-order condition  for the optimization problem  is
(5)  E[P]-  m +  [1  q,,  =0.
The last term in (5), 8E[P'"* ]  /  ql  , captures the ith processor's perceived effect of a change
in her q"'  on the manufactured  price,  E[P"'*]. This term is analogous to the conventional
market power  term  in  a  monopolist's  problem,  except  in this  case  the price  effect  also
accounts for the perceived quantity change (arising from a change  in q.. ) of other suppliers.
The expected price E[P'1*  ] depends, in part, on the associated probabilities of the market
equilibrium and government supported regimes. Define the probability that the government
supported  regime occurs  as  ID(a)  and the probability that the market equilibrium regime
occurs as 1- 0)(a):
(6a)  Prob(P"' +e "  Pg)=  P  ((a), and
(6b)  Prob(P"' + £"  > pg) = 1  - (D(a),
where  D(a)  is the cumulative  standard normal of e "' evaluated at a  - (P_ - P'") / a m, and
o '" is the standard deviation of  '". Hence, the unconditional expectation for P"'* is
(7)  E[Pn]  = (1-D)  E[P1"*  Pi"  +  "' > pg] +  pg.
Given (2a), the first term on the right-hand side of (7)  can be expressed as (Maddala, pp.
158-59):
(8)  E[P'1* |  P'" +  s'"  > Pg] = P" +  ±'"')  / (1-  ¢),
where (  is the standard normal density, again evaluated at a.  The last term in (8) is similar
to Heckman's bias correction term for selectivity bias arising from price censoring  caused
by the price support program.  Upon substituting (8)  into (7), the unconditional expectation
for P`*  is
E[p'"*  ] =  - (1 - ){ p  + c  ,',  / (1-  )} + (DPg.
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The expression  in (9) can be substituted for the first term in the first-order condition  in
(5).  In addition,  (9) can be used to derive the last term in (5), aE[P"'*]  /  ql". Differentiate
(9)  with  respect  to  q7'  and  make  use  of the  fact that  · and  4  are both  evaluated  at
a -(P  - P" )/  "':
no^"*  -n  p m 9l)d"(1-')  8  P'D  +8Pg. (10)  aE[Pn](1 q)aP  + a(lI))  aPn pin  +i  a+  ap  +  '  ani  pn aq  8"  aq7 1 ip m aqP  n  ap  P"  aq"  8P'  apq7
Let  -P
8 "-P' and,  hence,a  Xa  (/a"n.  Using  the  derivative  rules  that
&a / 9a =  c  /I  a"  and  94  / 8,  = -a+  / a"'  (Maddala, p.365), (10) can be rewritten as:
(11)  E[P=* {(  1  P"  )  +-P"'  +  nta  /}t ~~(11)  aE4pin*~  _  ____=  (I  -_  (D__  7  Pg  - aqi 1 C  T  C  T  C  aq"
,pin
"qqi
Since  the  terms  associated  with  Pg cancel  out,  it  is  clear  that  the  remaining  term,
(l-  ()aP"'  / aq" 1 q",  he  second  line  of (1),  pertains  to the  ecase  where the market
equilibrium  regime prevails.  In this regime,  equation (3)  is simply Qii  = QglV.  To further
manipulate  (11),  one seeks an expression for (aP"' / aql  )q7. Denote  Qs""  / aqq'  as the ith
processor's  conjectural variation pertaining to the aggregate supply quantity of the product.
Applying  the chain rule  to (1)  and making use of the fact that,  in the market equilibrium
regime,  gynd = Qn  (and,  hence,  aQd / aQ"n  and  Q 11s  Ql'id  are  both equal  to one),  one
obtains
(12)  a  '"  a|_  n  - J  u a  in  ag-Pid agn  i  -_  piJpnli  Qi  agnd (12)  Q[" qi ,  q 1 aq1n  q  =  a  ind  aQ1  is  aq171  pnd(  aqsi
where  . "I"  . -a(ln P"
1 ) / a(ln Q"d ), which is the price flexibility with respect to commercial
quantity; and  kin  a(ln Q"gi  ) / a(ln q," ), which is the ith processor's  conjecture elasticity of
aggregate  supply with respect to a change in q
11.
If the  individual  processor  behaves  competitively,  she  would  conjecture  that,  as  she
changes  her output, other firms will adjust their quantities in such a way that the price the
individual  faces  will  remain  unchanged.  That  is,  X"'  = 0.  In  contrast,  if the  individual
processor  has monopoly  power,  any change  in her supply will perfectly coincide with the
change in the aggregate supply, that is,  .'. =  1. In general,  ,  E  [0,  1].  Substituting (12)  into
(11),  and then the resulting expression into (5) for aE[P"']  / aq)'q".  , the first-order condition
can  finally be expressed as:
[(1 - cD)P"  +a'  G  +  )PA]  a3c7  /aq;"  - )llll (13)  -[(-  oI  - p  aC  Iin  = (1s-)
Notice that the bracketed terms in the numerator in (13)are the expected output price, E[P" *],
and hence,  the left-hand side of (13)  is the Lerner  index measuring the price-cost margin.
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The right-hand side of(13) indicates that the price-cost margin is a function of market regime
probability (1  - I)), conjectural  elasticity of the processor (7  ), and the price flexibility of
the demand function  (r""11).
To summarize, the model  includes a demand  function with government price interven-
tion, (1) and (2); a supply relation,  (13); and a market equilibrium condition with possible
government purchases, (3). Therefore,  there are four equations in the model.  In the case of
the market  equilibrium  regime,  the endogenous  variables  contained  in the four equation
system are the following:  P'", P 'P, Q"id,  and Ql'. In the case of the government  supported
regime, Qr replaces  P1"*  (..' P'f*  P
g)  as an endogenous  variable.
The Switching Dairy Model
The dairy model used in this study includes a manufactured dairy product subsector and a
fluid  milk  subsector.  The  model  focuses  on  the wholesale  processing level  of the  dairy
industry,  because  government price intervention occurs at this level. Under the dairy price
support program, the government supports the farm milk price indirectly by agreeing to buy
unlimited quantities of manufactured dairy products (cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk) in
the  wholesale  market  at  announced  "purchase  prices."  With  minor  modifications  the
framework  presented  in  the  previous  section  is  appropriate  for  the manufactured  dairy
product subsector.
The retailer's demand equation for manufactured dairy products in the wholesale market
is specified  in inverse form as:
(14)  p  =  p1  (QI1,,Q  Q i Z"),
where the superscript m is used to denote manufactured  dairy product andf the fluid milk
product. Equation (14) is the same as (1),  except now the fluid quantity (Q/) is also included
as a right-hand  side variable, accounting  for the cross-quantity effect on price. Notice that
no distinction is made between fluid milk supply and demand (i.e., Q.' = Qd =_ Q  '),  because
there is no direct government intervention in this market. With the additional cross-quantity
term, (12)  is modified:4
r  I)  fQl'"1
(15)  q"'  =  pM  1  l--  s
where rl " f  --(lnP'")  /  . (lnQ').
To simplify the estimation,  it  is assumed that milk processing at  the wholesale  level
follows a Leontief-type technology of fixed proportions between farm milk and other inputs.
With  (12)  being  replaced  by (15)  and  the  fixed  proportions  assumption,  the  first-order
condition in (13) becomes
4With Q/appearing as an additional argument for P",  one adds (OP"' / OQ' r) (@Q' ' / Iq" ) to the curly bracketed  term in  the
first line of( 12). The term  oaQ'  / aq"  is  interpreted as the ith manufactured product processor's conjectural variation pertaining
to  the aggregate fluid supply quantity.  Details on the derivation can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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(16)  [(-  I  ) P'  + c  +  Pg  ]  - - C"  /  (  / Q"
(16)  --- p ,,!  - ' l --  =(l-o)("ll''-^M  (I/  )D,
where P" is the Class II price that manufactured  dairy processors must pay for farm milk
input,5 and  C,'  is now defined as the cost function associated  with other variable  inputs.
The Fluid  Milk Subsector
The retailer's demand equation for fluid milk in the wholesale market is specified in inverse
form as follows:
(17)  .f = pf(Q'f,  Qm,  Z),
where Z' is a vector of fluid demand  shifters. Denoting  F. as a shock to the fluid demand
equation, the observed fluid price is
(18)  Pf  = P  +  '.
Since there is no direct government price  intervention in the fluid milk market, E[P *]  = P.
Regarding  the supply side of the fluid submodel,  consider the following profit maximi-
zation problem for individual fluid processorj:
(19)  max  ' = (Pt - P" - d) q{  - Cf(q-f  W- ),
where P" + d is the Class I farm milk price, which is  equal  to the Class II price  plus the
exogenous  Class  I differential  (d);  q' . is  the jth fluid  processor's  supply  quantity  (with
E.  q f  = Q1); and Cf is the processing cost function,  which depends on qf and a vector of
parametric variable processing costs (W).
Upon  manipulation,  the  fluid processor's  first-order  condition  can  be  written  as the
following price-cost margin expression:6
p'  - P"  - d  - WCI'  /  1aqF I (20)  pr  _  p  _  d-AC,  / Oq  r =  [rl  ' -(1-(I)) qfi" Qr  /  Q,  ]  X/.
(20)  pf  ,
j =[^.  -(1-h)1.n  Q  /Qr]^
where r.  - (lnP1) / a(ln Q(),  l im  - a(lnPf)  /  (lnnQmd), and
'd  - a(ln Q)  /  (In q,).
5Under the federal milk marketing order system, manufactured daily product processors pay the Class II price for their milk,
while the fluid milk processors  pay the Class I price which  is equal to the Class II price plus a fixed Class I differential.
6Similar to the manufactured  dairy products case, the derivation begins with applying  the chain rule to the demand equation
in  (17).  Details of the derivation  can be obtained  from the authors upon request.
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To facilitate time-series data estimation, the individual processor's first-order conditions
in (16)  and (20) are aggregated.  Assuming a generalized Leontief technology, the aggregate
processing cost function for each subsector k (k = m andf)  can be written as:
k  W  k  )1/  2
marginal  cost  for  the  kth  subsector  is  ,  z  .(W  , Wk)/2  The  aggregated  first-order
conditions can then be written as:
(21)  P=  ( l -)P  + a "  +pg  - (  Wi)
l/2
_pn (1 - D)(rT  "nn  - rl" ef'  Qe  / Q'^)xl,  and
(22)  P"  +d  = P  E  - ,,  (  Wj  )
2 '  _ p-. [r 1.t  -(1_  i)r  I., Q  / Q,, d]Xi
where, as discussed in Appelbaum,  Xk  is the aggregate conjectural elasticity (measuring the
average  industry conduct) for processors in the kth subsector.
To give some structure to the average industry conduct parameters in (21)  and (22), it is
hypothesized  that Xk  (k = m andf) is a function of the probability of the market equilibrium
regime occurring (1 - 1). Further, since Xk  lies between zero and one, the following logistic
function  is specified:
(23)  Xk  =l/{ + exp[  -k(  - )]}.
Including  1-  1 as an explanatory  variable for  Xk  can provide  insight toward the issue of
whether  competition  is more  pervasive  in  market  equilibrium  or government  supported
regimes.  For  example,  according  to  Rotemberg  and Saloner,  one  might expect to  find a
negative  relationship  between  Xk  and  1-  ,because  individual  dairy  processors,  in  an
attempt  to  capture  a  larger  share  of the  "boom"  market,  are  inclined  to  behave  more
competitively in the market equilibrium regime.
Substituting (23) into (21)  and (22), the aggregate first-order conditions for manufactured
and fluid processors become
(24)  PN =(l-  I  )Pm  +T  )++ipg  _P-S  i  Z./p  M(  Wi;
l )l/2
P"'  (1 - )(rl  m  i-n  rl  /  Qen  / Q')
(25)-+d=  -*  )-  [  ,  ,]and
+ exp '  "( I  +exply'- -)]
(25)  P" +d  p_/'(w·f  W/),/2  p-B/-(1-)'  Q  /  Qm]
j1  Y+  exp[¥ f  -_  '(1l-  cI)]
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The Closure
To  close the  model,  the farm component  is briefly  introduced.  Given the Leontief fixed
proportions  assumption between  farm milk  and other processing  inputs, the quantities of
wholesale fluid and manufactured products can be expressed on a farm milk equivalent basis.
Then,  Q"' 1 1 and  Q' can  also be used  to denote the derived  demand  for farm  milk of dairy
processors  at the farm level.  The linkage between the farm and wholesale markets  can be
written as follows:
(26)  Q= Q'lS  + Q
where  Q  is the farm milk supply, assumed  to be predetermined  due to lags  in farm milk
production.
To summarize, the wholesale component of  the model includes the following: a wholesale
manufactured product demand function with government price intervention  [(14) and (2)];
a wholesale manufactured product supply relation (24); a wholesale fluid demand function
[(17)  and (18)];  a wholesale fluid supply relation (25); a wholesale manufactured  product
equilibrium  condition  with  possible  government  purchases (3);  and  a  wholesale  fluid
equilibrium  condition  (imposed  by using  a  common notation,  i.e.,  Q  fd= Q-  _ Qf).  The
farm  component of the model  includes  a farm milk demand function,  a farm milk supply
function, and a farm equilibrium condition. The predetermined farm milk supply assumption
yields farm milk supply = Q. Given that all quantity variables are expressed on an equivalent
basis, farm milk demand = Q"  + Qf. Thus, the farm component of the model  is concisely
captured  by  the  farm-wholesale  linkage  (26).  There  are  eight  equations  in  the  model
containing  eight endogenous  variables.  In  the case  of the market equilibrium regime, the
endogenous variables are as follows: P", p1,*  P1,  PfP*  ,  /, QPa,  Q  ,,,  and Q/.  In the case of the
government  supported regime, Qg replaces  P"'*  ('.  P"'*  Pg) as an endogenous variable.
The Estimation
The estimation procedure is similar to conventional two-stage (nonlinear) least squares, with
several exceptions. The structural equations to be estimated are the wholesale manufactured
and  fluid demand  functions  and  supply relations.  Similar to  the two-stage  least  squares
procedure,  the first-stage  involves  estimating  instruments for the endogenous  variables in
the right-hand  side of the structural equations, and the second stage consists of substituting
the instruments into the structural equations which are then estimated.
Instruments  for the quantity variables appearing on the right-hand side of the structural
equations  are  first  obtained  by  regressing  the  quantity  variables  on  all  the  exogenous
variables and their one-period to four-period lags. Given the quantity instruments, the two
inverse  demand  equations  are  estimated.  Specifically,  the manufactured  product  inverse
demand function is estimated by applying a maximum likelihood tobit procedure to (14)  and
(2), and the fluid inverse demand function is estimated  by using ordinary least squares on
(17)  and (18).  The tobit procedure  is needed for the manufactured demand function because
of the  limited  dependent  variable  problem  associated  with  the  manufactured  price;  as
indicated by (2), the manufactured price is constrained to be  no less than the government
purchase price.
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In addition to the quantity variables, the right-hand sides of the supply relations in (24)
and (25) involve other endogenous variables whose instruments must also be obtained. From
the  tobit  estimation  of the  manufactured  demand  function,  one  obtains  instruments  for
(),  4 and P"', as well  as estimates of rm",  rlf  and a  ". From the ordinary least  squares
estimation of the fluid demand function, one obtains an instrument for P/ as well as estimates
of rl  and rfi". Upon  substituting  the  obtained  instruments  (for quantity variables, P",
P 1,  I,  and  4 ) and estimates  (of  rln
t , rl  ml,  rl',  r./f , and ao  )  into (24) and (25), the two
first-order conditions can then be estimated.  Rather than using single-equation estimation,
the two first-order conditions  are estimated as  a system of nonlinear seemingly unrelated
equations because P" and P' are related by an exogenous Class I price differential. From the
system estimation, one obtains estimates of the remaining parameters  (  i,, y  k,  and X k; k =
m andf).
While the two-stage  procedure on a  structural equation system with limited dependent
variables is asymptomatically equivalent to a maximum likelihood estimation of the system,
the conventionally  computed second-stage  standard errors on the structural parameters  are
biased (Maddala).  The asymptotic  theory  for the above two-stage  estimation method  has
been  derived  by  Lee  and  may  be  used  to  correctly  compute  standard  errors  for  the
second-stage coefficients.  However,  as pointed out by Comick and Cox, such theory is both
complicated and not very general (i.e., the asymptotic covariance matrices have to be derived
for each permutation of the model). Hence,  a bootstrapping procedure after the fashion of
Cornick and  Cox is adopted to compute  the second-stage  standard errors of the structural
coefficients.7
Empirical  Results
Quarterly time series data from 1975 through  1992 are used to estimate the model. Variable
definition  and  source of data are  given  in  table  1. Since time-series  data are used  in  the
estimation, all the price variables in the model are deflated by the consumer price index for
all items. Table 2 presents the empirical  results for the two inverse demand equations. Both
inverse demand  equations are  estimated  in double-logarithmic  form  and as a  function  of
commercial  manufactured  and  fluid demand  quantities  (Qad and Qf);  the consumer  price
indices for nonalcoholic beverages (CPIBEV), fats and oils (CPIFAT), and away-from-home
food (CPIAFH); quarterly dummy  variables (Quarter-l,  Quarter-2, and  Quarter-3); and
generic manufactured/fluid  advertising  expenditures (GMAIGFA).  The quarterly  dummies
are to capture demand seasonality, while the advertising expenditures account for the impact
on  demand  of  generic  dairy  promotion  activities. 8 Autoregressive  terms  (AR)  for  the
residuals are added to the demand equations to correct for serial correlation.
The estimated manufactured and fluid own-price  flexibility coefficients are both nega-
tive, confirming  that the demand  curves are downward sloping.  The estimated  cross-price
flexibility coefficients  in both demand equations are negative, indicating that the two dairy
products  are  gross  substitutes.  Except  for  CPIBEV in  the  fluid  demand  equation,  the
coefficients for the three price index variables are positive  in both equations,  suggesting a
7The procedure involves  re-estimating  the model  for each bootstrap  data set. The  number of replications  is 350.
XTo capture  the carryover  effect  of advertising, GMA  and  GFA are specified  as a second-order polynomial  distributed  lag
function of the previous  four quarters'  advertising expenditures, with end-point restrictions imposed for GFA but not for GMA.
Imposition of the end-point  restrictions  for GMA  is  difficult because the manufactured demand equation  is estimated  by the
tobit procedure.
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Table  1.  Variable Definitions  and Data Sources
Variable  Definition  Unit  Sourcea
Qls  Wholesale manufactured  supply  bil.  lbs. of milkfat equivalent  DSO
Qld  Wholesale manufactured  demand  bil.  Ibs. of milkfat equivalent  DSO
Qf  Wholesale fluid  supply and demand  bil. Ibs. of milkfat equivalent  DSO
p"  Wholesale manufactured  product  $/cwt  DSO
price
P'  Wholesale fluid milk price  $/cwt  DSO
Pg  Government  manufactured product  $/cwt  DSO
purchase price
P11 Class II price  $/cwt  FMOM
d  Class I price differential  $/cwt  FMOM
CPIFA T  Consumer  price index for fats and oil  1967=100  CPI
CPIBEV  Consumer  price index for non-  1967=100  CPI
alcoholic beverages
CPIAFH  Consumer price index for away-  1967=100  CPI
from-home food
PPIFE  Producer price index for fuel and  1967=100  EE
energy
WAGE  Average hourly wage in food  $/hr.  EE
manufacturing sector
GMA  Generic manufactured  product  $1,000  LNA
advertising expenditures
GFA  Generic fluid advertising  $1,000  LNA
expenditures
"Detailed  citations are in the list of references.
substitution relationship  between the dairy product in question and the food groups  repre-
sented by the price indices. The coefficients for generic advertising expenditures are positive
in both the fluid and manufactured demand equations but statistically significant only in the
fluid case. 9 Finally, the estimated a"' in the tobit equation is significantly different  from
zero,  corroborating  the importance of correcting for selectivity bias arising from the dairy
price support program.
The estimated equations for the first-order conditions  in (24) and (25) are presented  in
table  3. In this table, PPIFE  is the producer price  index for fuel and energy,  and WAGE is
the average  hourly wage  in the manufacturing  sector of the general economy.  These two
prices  are  included to reflect the variable processing costs (W) appearing  in (24) and (25).
Similar to the demand equations, an autoregressive  term for the residuals  is added to each
of the two first-order conditions to correct for serial correlation.
9Deleting  the  advertising  variable  from  the manufactured  demand  equation  does not  change  in  any significant  way  the
estimated coefficients of the remaining variables. Hence, it is left in the equation to be consistent with the fluid demand equation.
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Table 2.  Estimated Manufactured and Fluid Inverse  Demand Equations (Double-Log)
Manufactured  Equation  Fluid Equation
Estimated  Estimated









































































"GMA and GFA are specified  as a second-order polynomial  distributed lag function of the previous four quarters'  advertising
expenditures.  End-point restrictions are imposed for GFA (in the OLS fluid equation) but not for GMA  (in the tobit manufactured
equation).
The coefficients  of interest to this study are the ones associated with the average industry
conduct parameters  in equation (23).  As mentioned,  the relationship between  (I - 0D)  and
Xk  is expected to be negative because  individual dairy processors,  in an attempt to capture
a larger share  of the boom market,  may be inclined  to behave more  competitively  in the
market equilibrium regime. This hypothesis  is not rejected by the empirical results, as the
estimated coefficients  for fluid and manufactured milk markets are negative and statistically
significant  at  the  1%  level.  The implications  of this  result  are  rather  interesting.  If the
government continues  to deregulate the dairy price support program in the future, then the
probability of a market equilibrium regime occurring will  increase over time. Since  Xk  and
(1-  (D) are negatively related, the result implies that deregulation will have a pro-competi-
tive effect  on the market conduct of fluid and manufactured processors.
To  gain  insight  on  the  magnitude  of  market power  in both  markets, the conjectural
elasticities  for  manufactured  and  fluid  processors  are  computed  from  (23),  using  the
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Table 3.  Estimated Manufactured and Fluid Processor First-Order Conditions
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  t-Value
Manufactured  First-Order Condition:
PPIFE  (p  fI)  - 0.222  -1.4
(PPIFE*  WAGE)I 2 (P1i  )  0.704  1.4
WAGE  (P/)  - 2.117  -1.4
Intercept  (y  m)  3.330  14.8
1-0  I  (8 m)  - 2.660  -10.9
AR(I)  0.609  6.2
Adjusted R2 = 0.91
Durbin-Watson  =  1.9
Fluid First-Order  Condition:
PPIFE  (P3)  0.318  59.3
(PPIFE*  WAGE)1 /2 (P/)  -1.002  -64.3
f
WAGE.  (, / )  4.655  77.8
Intercept  (y  )  1.778  26.5
1-I  (8f)  - 0.630  -22.4
AR(1)  0.647  6.9
Adjusted R2 = 0.88
Durbin-Watson  = 2.1
Note: The system of first-order conditions is estimated by the seemingly unrelated regression procedure.
estimates of y  and 6 .Table 4 presents the simulated conjectural elasticities and their t-ratios
over the period of 1976-92.10 For most periods of the sample, the conjectural  elasticities of
manufactured  processors are  found to be smaller than those of fluid processors;  the mean
values of X"' and  J'1  are 0.100 and 0.176,  respectively.  The  finding that fluid processors
behave  in  a  less competitive  manner  than manufactured  processors  is  intuitive  because
markets for fluid milk are less national in scope due to the perishability and relatively high
transportation  costs  of the  product.  While  the  average  industry conduct  parameters  of
manufactured  and fluid processors  are statistically  different from zero for all the quarters,
the magnitudes  of these parameters  are not alarming,  as they are still closer to zero (perfect
competition)  than  one (monopoly).  Furthermore,  both parameters  do not exhibit a strong
pattern  of increasing  over time;  a finding which  is  reassuring  given that the industry has
become more concentrated over the sample period.
!
0The variances of the simulated conjectural elasticities are obtained through  bootstrapping.
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Table 4.  Simulated Manufactured and Fluid Conjectural Elasticities
Year  Quarter  )'"  t-Value  V
' t-Value Year  Quarter  X"'  t-Value  X'  t-Value
0.092  11.3  0.178
0.172  21.5  0.204
0.080  9.8  0.173
0.153  19.0  0.198
0.101  12.4  0.181
0.096  11.7  0.179
0.050  6.1  0.156
0.057  6.9  0.160
0.045  5.5  0.152
0.072  8.7  0.168
0.041  5.1  0.150
0.078  9.5  0.172
0.103  12.7  0.182
0.154  19.1  0.199
0.053  6.5  0.158
0.186  23.4  0.208
0.313  41.1  0.236
0.249  32.0  0.223
0.207  26.2  0.213
0.249  32.0  0.223
0.224  28.5  0.217
0.148  18.4  0.197
0.128  15.8  0.191
0.149  18.4  0.197
0.207  26.2  0.213
0.135  16.7  0.193
0.119  14.6  0.188
0.137  17.0  0.194
0.143  17.8  0.196
0.150  18.6  0.198
0.164  20.4  0.202
0.072  8.8  0.169
0.110  13.6  0.185
0.086  10.5  0.175
0.050  6.1  0.156





































1985  I  0.080  9.7
II  0.056  6.8
III  0.059  7.2
IV  0.071  8.7
1986  1  0.139  17.2
II  0.071  8.7
III  0.102  12.5
IV  0.062  7.6
1987  I  0.156  19.4
II  0.121  14.8
III  0.064  7.8
IV  0.075  9.2
1988  1  0.108  13.3
II  0.062  7.5
III  0.058  7.0
IV  0.043  5.2
1989  I  0.090  11.0
I1  0.092  11.3
III  0.050  6.0
IV  0.053  6.5
1990  I  0.047  5.7
II  0.036  4.4
III  0.036  4.4
IV  0.046  5.6
1991  1  0.037  4.6
11  0.035  4.3
III  0.052  6.3
IV  0.040  5.0
1992  1  0.084  10.2
II  0.036  4.5
III  0.061  7.4
IV  0.035  4.3
Mean 0.100
Summary
Bridging  the  market  conduct  and  switching  regime  literatures,  this  article  presents  a
framework  to  estimate  the  market  power  of an  oligopolistic  industry  where  there  is  a
government price support program impacting firms' output price. The proposed framework
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processors  in the U.S. dairy industry. The study  also examined whether  government price
intervention  in the dairy  industry has a pro-competitive  or anti-competitive  influence on
market conducts.
The results indicated that the average industry conduct parameters of manufactured and
fluid processors  were statistically different  from zero (perfect competition)  for all quarters
during the period of 1976-92. However,  the magnitudes of these estimated parameters were
found not be alarming as they are  still closer to zero than one (monopoly).  The results also
indicated  that  manufactured  and  fluid processors  tend  to behave  in a more competitive
manner  in the market equilibrium regime  than in the government  supported regime.  This
result  suggests  that  further  deregulation  of the  dairy price  support program  will  have  a
pro-competitive impact on market conduct.
Though  the oligopolistic  switching  regime estimation  framework  was specifically  ap-
plied to the dairy processing industry, it can also be employed to a farm-level  problem.  For
example,  the  procedure can be  invoked  to  examine  the selling power of a group of big
farmers whose  output price  is  under the control of a government price  support program.
Further,  the framework  can  be modified  to derive  a procedure  for  estimating the buying
power of processors (e.g.,  flour processors buying wheat) and big farmers (e.g.,  large hog
and poultry producers  buying  corn) whose input price  is the subject of government price
interventions.
[Received October 1994;final  version received September 1995.]
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